Autorentext

Preston Stovall is an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences at the University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic, and the author of The Single-Minded Animal: Shared Intentionality, Normativity, and the Foundations of Discursive Cognition. He works in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and metaphysics.

Ladislav Koren is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic and the director of the Language, Mind, Society Center based at this department. His areas of interest include philosophy of cognitive sciences, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic, and the philosophy of psychology.

Klappentext

The social practices and skills for giving, assessing, and responding to reasons play a key role in the constitution of uniquely human conceptual, epistemic, and deliberative powers. It is thus of great interest to explore why and how humans give and ask for reasons. In addition, it is increasingly recognized that an adequate understanding of such questions calls for a multi-perspectival, often dialogical, cross-fertilizing and integrative approach. Current research at the interface of philosophy and the sciences is already yielding new data, explanations, and predictions concerning the origins, purposes, development, and consequences of human discursive practices and skills, but representative overviews of this research are still missing from the literature.

Why and How We Give and Ask for Reasons aims to fill this lacuna by bringing together new essays that approach the topic from integrative perspectives that promise to stimulate future research. The chapter authors include established figures in both philosophy and the sciences, as well as a number of younger scholars. The volume as a whole enables philosophers, cognitive scientists, developmental and comparative psychologists, and evolutionary anthropologists to deepen discussions on the reason-querying accounts of human cognition.

Inhalt

• Introduction

• Ladislav Koren

• Part I: Social-Epistemological Perspectives

• Chapter 1: The Social Practice of Giving and Asking for Reasons

• Hilary Kornblith

• Chapter 2: Commitment Coordination and the Social Function of Reason-Giving

• Jeremy Randel Koons

• Chapter 3: Second-Person Normativity

• Glenda Satne

• Part II: Logical Perspectives

• Chapter 4: Reasoning, Reason Relations, and Semantic Content

• Robert Brandom

• Chapter 5: GOGAR and Logical Theories

• Jaroslav Peregrin

• Chapter 6: Reasons for Asking

• Jared Millson and Mark Risjord

• Chapter 7: Rejection as a Mental Act: Model-Theoretic and Proof-Theoretic Varieties

• Preston Stovall

• Part III: Developmental Perspectives

• Chapter 8: Respect for Reasons in Human Development

• David Moshman

• Chapter 9: Reasoning and Trust: A Developmental Perspective

• Bahar Köymen and Catarina Dutilh Novaes

• Chapter 10: Objectivity and the Space of Reasons

• Ladislav Koren

• Part IV: Evolutionary-Comparative Perspectives

• Chapter 11: Ways of Reasoning in Humans and Other Animals

• Cathal O'Madagain

• Chapter 12: The Evolution of Articulated Reasons: Reasoning as Discursive Niche Construction

• Joseph Rouse

• Chapter 13: Rationality and Reflection in Human and Non-Human Animals

• Giacomo Melis

• Chapter 14: A Functionalist Approach to Additive and Transformative Rationality

• Yannick Kohl