Despite the modem recovery of virtue theory in ethics, conceptions of temperance remain largely unexamined. In this study I offer an examination ofcertain interpretive threads oftemperance as a virtue beginning in classical philosophy and moving through early to medieval Christian conceptions. I find contemporary notions oftemperance to be sorely lacking when compared and contrasted to these historical conceptions. Aristotelian and Thomistic accounts of temperance are particularly important to the normative statement of temperance I offer here. To fully understand temperance one must recognize its place among the moral virtues, in particular phronesis or practical judgment. Though I place temperance within practical judgment, this study stops short ofoffering a full account of virtue theory and how it mayor may not relate to other theories ofthe moral life. While contemporary views of temperance occasionally note its general relevance to the experience of emotion, I elaborate upon the work of temperance as an essential part of the effort to include emotion in the moral life. In present-day studies of the psychology of emotion, cognitive theories have reasserted the classical conception of emotion as consisting of both physiological and psychological elements ofhuman personhood. Temperance is the primary virtue in the moral agent's effort to appropriately include the entirety ofthe emotional experience in moral deliberation. I find it relevant to a moral response to both the physiological and psychological elements of emotion.

Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Klappentext

This book is the most extensive study in many decades of the virtue temperance. It examines certain interpretive threads of temperance as a virtue beginning in classical philosophy and moving through early to medieval Christian conceptions. Rather than simply offering a normative view of temperance, this book seeks to understand how temperance works to engage and include the experience of emotion in morality. In present-day studies of the psychology of emotion, cognitive theories have reasserted the classical conception of emotion as consisting of both physiological and psychological elements of human personhood. Temperance is the primary virtue in the moral agent's cognitive response to the movements of emotion. br/ Application of the possibilities for this renewal of temperance comes with an examination of how emotion will help moral deliberation in the clinical practice of medicine. Sir William Osler (1849-1919) and his doctrine of emaequanimitas/em is greatly misunderstood to be the founder of emotional detachment in physician/patient relations. This book offers the most detailed look at emaequanimitas/em in print and equates it with a normative view of temperance as a moral virtue. br/ For upper-level undergraduate and graduate-level students interested in ethics, bioethics, and moral psychology; Oslerians; and students of Aristotle's and Aquinas' view of the moral virtues.

Inhalt
1 The Broad Conception Of Temperance.- 2 The Narrow Conception Of Temperance.- 3 A Normative Account Of Temperance.- 4 Emotion, Desire, And Morality.- 5 Temperance In Relation To Emotion.- 6 Temperance As Equanimity In Clinical Medicine.- 7 Emotion And The Care Ethic In Clinical Deliberation.- 8 Conclusion: Care-Ful, Rational, Moral Deliberation.