The years of study on Husserl's theory of intentionality have led to a number of non-equivalent interpretations. The present work attempts to investigate the most prominent of these by presenting both their advantages and difficulties. However, its key point is specifically the analysis of Husserl's theory. This is made in several stages that are concerned with the relation between noesis and noema: whether it is one-to-one or many-to-one, the kind of transcendency and dependency between them, and whether noema supervenes on noesis. Moreover, Husserl's theory is also examined inusually ignoredinstances of contradiction, nonsense and intentional conflict. The outcome is a fresh reading in which noema occurs as the possibly thinkable content capable of constituting multi-objective references and composed of pure X explained in terms of syntactic matter and form.

Autorentext
Dr Lukasz Kosowski is a young, non-associated researcher working mainly in the field of Husserlian phenomenology, formal ontology and philosophy of mind. However, he is also interested in the problems of contemporary neuroscience. His main work concerns the interpretation of noema that would specify Husserl s theory of intentionality and make it suitable for application in other philosophical and scientific fields.

Klappentext
The series is devoted to monographs and anthologies on Austrian philosophy (Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong and others) as well as on phenomenology and its history in general. Moreover, the series is open to a wide variety of different approaches in the philosophy of mind.