A Priori Knowledge

The book sets out to analyze the notion of a priori justification and of a priori knowledge. The most influential explanations of the a priori within the contemporary analytic tradition are analyzed. It is shown that the theories which group around the notion of implicit definition ultimately entail that the propositions which can be known a priori are to be analyzed along conventionalist lines. It is argued that the notion of objective a priori knowledge requires a commitment to the existence of a faculty which is the source of and justifies that kind of knowledge. The existence and functioning of this faculty cannot be explained within a strictly naturalistic set of constraints. Attention to the phenomenology of justification (validation) both of observational and purportedly a priori statements however reveals that the naturalistic demands are based on an asymmetry thesis among perception (and credited genuine sources of justification) and rational insight which is false. Therefore it is argued that a corresponding symmetry thesis must be accepted, according to which rational insight should be regarded as a justification-conferring faculty. In the final part of the book it is argued that Husserl's conception of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and of concept constitution, allow for an objective interpretation both of analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge.

Klappentext
The series is devoted to monographs and anthologies on Austrian philosophy (Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong and others) as well as on phenomenology and its history in general. Moreover, the series is open to a wide variety of different approaches in the philosophy of mind.

Inhalt
Introduction

1. A Priori, Analyticity, and Implicit Definition
   Empiricism, Analyticity, and the A Priori
   Reductive and Non-Reductive Conceptions of Analyticity
   Implicit Definition, Logical Truth, and the Recalcitrant A Priori
   Problems with Implicit Definition
   BonJour s Objection
   Fodor and Lepore s Objection
   Horwich s Objection
   Hale and Wright s defence of the traditional connection
   Logic and Convention
   Coda
2. Realism about Logic
   Introduction
   Logical Principles, Justification and Epistemic Relativity
   Objective Truth
   Resnik s Attack
   Wittgenstein on the necessity of 1 inch = 2.54 cm
   and logical inference
   Dummett s Objection
   Rule Following considerations and the adoption of a convention
   Summarising Remarks
   Wright s Attack
3. Objective Knowledge
   Introduction
   What the Tortoise Said to Boghossian
   What Boghossian would say to the Tortoise
   Rule-circular Arguments
   The Side-Argument
   Rejecting the Side-Argument
   First Horn: Simple Internalism and Rational Insight
   Second Horn: Epistemic Responsibility and the Lack
   of Epistemic Irresponsibility
   Realism, the A priori and Rational Insight
   Boghossian s Argument against Relativism
   Epistemological Realism about Justification
   Conclusion
4. Phenomenology and Rational Insight
   Naturalism and Justification
   Phenomenology, Justification, and Eidetic Seeing
   Is Holism a Possibility for the Empiricist?
   Intuition of Essences and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
   Husserl s Conception of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
   Eidetic Variation
   Passive synthesis and Concept Constitution
   Knowledge of Reality and Conceptual Truth
   Absolute vs Relative Objectivity
   Are Conceptual Truths True?
   Conclusion
   References