Deception and Delay in Organized Conflict

This book explores the role of deception, delay, and self-deception in the dynamics of organized conflict, taking a formal approach that hews closely to the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories. The resulting probability models can, with some effort-and some confidence-be converted to statistical tools for the analysis of real-time observational and 'experimental' data on institutionalized confrontation across both traditional and emerging 'Clausewitz Landscapes'.

Inhalt

1. Failure of controlIntroductionThe Data Rate TheoremCognition rate and stabilityMultiple delaysMultiple theatersControl system thrashingDiscussionReferences2 Failure of institutional cognition IIntroductionThe Data Rate TheoremScalarizing resources and their interactionsFog, friction, and delayInstitutional cognition under delayDiscussionReferences3 Failure of institutional cognition IIIntroductionInstitutional cognition reconsideredIterated 'Free Energy' and system dynamicsSome examplesSome remarks on workgroup topologyDiscussionMathematical AppendixReferences4 The 'Self-Maskirovka' of military scientismIntroductionThe Data Rate TheoremScalarizing resources and their interactionsA first failure modelA second failure modelOther 'regression models'DiscussionReferences5 Extending the models