Deception and Delay in Organized Conflict

This book explores the role of deception, delay, and self-deception in the dynamics of organized conflict, taking a formal approach that hews closely to the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories. The resulting probability models can, with some effortand some confidencebe converted to statistical tools for the analysis of real-time observational and 'experimental' data on institutionalized confrontation across both traditional and emerging 'Clausewitz Landscapes'.

Provides first formal treatment of delay and deception in organized conflict that focuses on probability models Uses the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories Explores the dynamics of deception and delay in organized conflict rigorously

Inhalt

1. Failure of control.- 2 Failure of institutional cognition I.- 3 Failure of institutional cognition II.- 4 The 'Self-Maskirovka' of military scientism.- 5 Extending the models.