A Course in Game Theory

Presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts

Informationen zum Autor Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein Klappentext A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises. Zusammenfassung A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

Autorentext

Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein

Klappentext

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

Inhalt
Part 1 Introduction: game theory; games and solutions; game theory and the theory of competitive equilibrium; rational behaviour; the steady state and deductive interpretations; bounded rationality; terminology and notation. Part 2 Strategic games: Nash equilibrium; mixed, correlated, and evolutionary equilibrium; rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions; knowledge and equilibrium. Part 3 Extensive games with perfect information: extensive games with perfect information; bargaining games; repeated games; complexity considerations in repeated games; implementation theory. Part 4 Extensive games with imperfect information: extensive games with imperfect information; sequential equilibrium. Part 5 Coalitional games: the core; stable sets, the bargaining set, and the Shapley value; the Nash solution.