In authoritarian states, the discourse on freedom of speech, conducted by those opposed to non-democratic governments, focuses on the core aspects of this freedom: on a right to criticize the government, a right to advocate theories arid ideologies contrary to government-imposed orthodoxy, a right to demand institutional reforms, changes in politics, resignation of the incompetent and the corrupt from positions of authority. The claims for freedom of speech focus on those exercises of freedom that are most fundamental and most beneficial to citizens - and which are denied to them by the government. But in a by-and large democratic polity, where these fundamental benefits of freedom of speech are generally enjoyed by the citizens, the public and scholarly discourse on freedom of speech hovers about the peripheries of that freedom; the focus is on its outer boundaries rather than at the central territory of freedom of speech. Those borderline cases, in which people who are otherwise genuinely committed to the core aspects of freedom of speech may sincerely disagree, include pornography, racist hate speech and religious bigoted expressions, defamation of politicians and of private persons, contempt of court, incitement to violence, disclosure of military or commercial secrets, advertising of merchandise such as alcohol or cigarettes or of services and entertainment such as gambling and prostitution.

Klappentext

Freedom of speech is important but not absolute. Nearly everyone agree that law should prevent harm, even when that harm is inflicted through words. But how can we reconcile this with the value of freedom of expression? This book offers a principled approach to this vexed problem. Since the contents and the limits of freedom of speech are informed by its moral and political rationales, the discussion begins by considering the main philosophical arguments usually supplied for elevating freedom of speech above other social values. It then develops a framework for analyzing the relationship between speech and harm, and discusses the idea that legal restrictions on speech should be viewpoint-neutral. The book also examines the notion that speech restrictions may be a useful way of both equalizing expressive opportunities in society and remedying discrimination produced through speech acts. Various theoretical threads of the book are then drawn together to culminate in a discussion of one of the most controversial questions confronting modern democratic societies: should racially vilifying speech (hate speech) be prohibited by law? The book is addressed to philosophers of law, political theorists, constitutional lawyers and everyone interested in protecting civil rights.

Inhalt
Preface.- 1: Justifications of Freedom of Speech.- 1 Search for Truth.- 2 Individual Autonomy.- 3 Democracy and Self-Government.- 4 Tolerance.- 2: Speech and Harm.- 1 Levels of Scrutiny.- 2 Low and High Value Speech.- 3 Speech-Plus and Symbolic Action.- 4 Speech and Harm: A Case Study of R.A.V..- 3: Speech and Equality.- 1 Equal Opportunity and Public Speech.- 2 Silencing.- 3 Asymmetry of Fighting Words.- 4: Discrimination and Illocutionary Acts.- 1 Illocutions and Perlocutions.- 2 Authority in Discriminatory Illocutions.- 5: Viewpoint Neutrality and Its Rationales.- 1 Two Types of Neutrality.- 2 What is A Viewpoint? A Case Study of Rosenberger.- 3 Reasonableness and Viewpoint Regulations: A Case Study of Lamb's Chapel.- 4 Rationales for Viewpoint Neutrality and Subject-Matter Neutrality.- 5 The Content/Viewpoint Distinction and the Level of Generality.- 6 Indirect Viewpoint Discrimination.- 7 Paternalism and Intolerance.- 6: Racial Vilification and Freedom of Speech.- 1 The Context of the Hate-Speech Controversy.- 2 The Contours of Racial Vilification.- 3 The Harms of Hate Speech.- 4 Liberalism and Prohibitions of Hate Speech.