The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV

"The merits of volume 4 (and all the volumes to date) are numerous. Most important is the sustained, in-depth attention given to the congress and the war. . . . Gibbons's usage of archival sources for the period under study is very impressive."

Autorentext

William Conrad Gibbons

Klappentext

This fourth volume of a five-part policy history of the U.S. government and the Vietnam War covers the core period of U.S. involvement, from July 1965, when the decision was made to send large-scale U.S. forces, to the beginning of 1968, just before the Tet offensive and the decision to seek a negotiated settlement. Using a wide variety of archival sources and interviews, the book examines in detail the decisions of the president, relations between the president and Congress, and the growth of public and congressional opposition to the war. Differences between U.S. military leaders on how the war should be fought are also included, as well as military planning and operations. Among many other important subjects, the financial effects of the war and of raising taxes are considered, as well as the impact of a tax increase on congressional and public support for the war. Another major interest is the effort by Congress to influence the conduct of the war and to place various controls on U.S. goals and operations. The emphasis throughout this richly textured narrative is on providing a better understanding of the choices facing the United States and the way in which U.S. policymakers tried to find an effective politico-military strategy, while also probing for a diplomatic settlement. Originally published in 1995. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Inhalt

PREFACE VII MAP: Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Conference xiii CHAPTER 1. FRANCE RESUMES CONTROL AND THE WAR BEGINS 1 Development of the U.S. Position on Trusteeships 7 The Communist Threat and Its Effects on U.S. Policy Toward Colonial Problems 17 The Executive Branch Debates U.S. Policy Toward Indochina 18 Congress Begins Debate on U.S. Policy in Asia 23 The War Begins in Vietnam, 1946-48 25 The Commitment is Made to "Containment" and to the Defense of "Free Peoples 26 Congress Also Approves the Use of Military Advisers 34 The Debate Over Intervening in China 38 China Falls to the Communists and Debate Begins on Defending Vietnam 48 Approval of Funds for the General Area of China 54 CHAPTER 2. THE U.S. JOINS THE WAR 64 The Decision to Become Involved in the War in Indochina 65 Congress Passes Legislation to Provide New Aid for Indochina 68 The Anti-Communist Offensive and NSC 68 71 The Effects of the Korean War 78 The Question of Using American Forces in Indochina 78 Congress Provides Additional Aid for Indochina 85 Developments in Indochina During 1951 as the U.S. Becomes More Involved 86 Congress Approves 1951 Legislation for Aid to Indochina 94 Renewed Concern About Indochina 97 Fear of Chinese Intervention 102 Deterring the Chinese 104 Approval of NSC 124/2 108 Congress Acts on 1952 Aid to Indochina 118 CHAPTER 3. PRELUDE TO FRENCH WITHDRAWAL 120 U.S. Increases Pressure on the French 121 Congressional Dissatisfaction with the French 129 The U.S. Increases Its Commitment 135 Further U.S. Efforts To Support French Forces 141 Another Reevaluation of U.S. Policy in Indochina 146 NSC 5405 and the Continuing Debate Over the U.S. Commitment to Defend Indochina 149 The Decision to Send U.S. Aircraft Technicians to Vietnam 155 The U.S.Prepares for Negotiations, and for War? 163 The Battle Bien Phu Begins 170 CHAPTER 4. RATTLING THE SABER 174 The U.S. Announces the United Action Concept 176 "The Day We Didn't Go To War"? 187 The NSC Postpones Action on Direct Intervention 197 Congress Debates Intervention 203 The British Oppose Intervention 207 Vice President Nixon Says Troops Might Be Sent 209 The French Again Request U.S. Airstrikes 212 The Final Decision Not to Intervene at Dien Bien Phu 221 Dien Bien Phu Falls and the U.S. Again Considers Intervening in Indo-china 225 CHAPTER 5. THE NEW U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM 228 Pro to Intervene and to Take Over From the French 232 The Army Objects 237 Eisenhower Continues to Insist on Conditions, and the U.S. Pulls away from the French 238 Reactions in Congress 243 The End of the First Indochina War 250 First Steps After Geneva 259 NSC 5429-Redefining U.S. Interests and Role 267 Establishment of SEATO 271 The Formosa Resolution 276 CHAPTER 6. COUNTERREVOLUTION AND "NATION BUILDING" DURING THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE WARS 282 The Collins Mission 287 Diem Clashes with the Beets and Washington Agrees to Seek a New Government 293 Diem Consolidates His Power 299 The U.S. and the "New Vietnam": Waging the Counterrevolution 301 Overt Aid for "Nation-Building I. 31: Congress and Aid to Vietnam and Laos 316 The Colegrove Hearings 321 Congressional Oversight of the CIA 3 The Beginning of the End of Diem's "Miracle" 331 Resumption of the Armed Struggle 334 Leadership in Vietnam and Laos Reconsidered 339 Another Step Toward the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 343 INDEX 351