This book proposes a new approach to the retributive theory of punishment, arguing that it should be understood in its traditional formulation that has been long forgotten or dismissed: that punishment is essentially a defense of the honor of the victim

This book addresses the problem of justifying the institution of criminal punishment. It examines the paradox of retribution: the fact that we cannot seem to reject the intuition that punishment is morally required, and yet we cannot (even after two thousand years of philosophical debate) find a morally legitimate basis for inflicting harm on wrongdoers. The book comes at a time when a new abolitionist movement has arisen, a movement that argues that we should give up the search for justification and accept that punishment is morally unjustifiable and should be discontinued immediately. This book, however, proposes a new approach to the retributive theory of punishment, arguing that it should be understood in its traditional formulation that has been long forgotten or dismissed: that punishment is essentially a defense of the honor of the victim. Properly understood, this can give us the possibility of a legitimate moral justification for the institution of punishment.

First book to expound a new theory that provides a rational foundation for the practice of punishment Provides a moral defense of revenge in a way never before attempted Gives a concise but systematic summary of the current state of the debate Is written at a level that is accessible to researchers and practitioners alike, avoiding technical philosophical jargon or abstruse issues in philosophy

Inhalt

Chapter One: The Problem of Punishment.- Chapter Two: Punishment as Crime Prevention.- Chapter Three: Can Retributive Punishment Be Justified?.- Chapter Four: The Mixed Theory of Punishment.- Chapter Five: Retribution and Revenge.- Chapter Six: What Is The Purpose of Retribution?.- Chapter Seven: Making Sense of Honor.- Chapter Eight: Is Punishment Justified?.- Index.