In this book, the author disputes the recent trend in metaethics that focuses on reasons rather than norms. The reader is invited to take a new look at the traditional metaethical questions of moral semantics, ontology, and epistemology.

Metaethics is the inquiry into the nature of morality (or ethics, I use the words 'morality', 'morals', and 'ethics' as synonyms). When we pass moral judgements, what kind of claims are we then making? I speak of this as the semantic metaethical question. a re there moral facts, to be discovered by us and existing independently of our thoughts and conceptualisation? I speak of this as the ontological or me- physical metaethical question. a nd, if there are, can we know about them; and, if we can, how do we get this kind of knowledge? I speak of this as the epistemic metaethical question. a ll these metaethical questions, the semantic, the ontological, and the epistemic ones, are raised and discussed in this book, but they are not the core questions raised. I have been more concerned with another kind of questions, which deserve to be called metaethical as well: what are the problems of morality? a re there many different moral questions, or, do they all, in the final analysis, reduce to only a few, or perhaps just one? t his question is of special importance to a non-naturalist objectivist and realist like the present author, who believes that we do make truth-claims when we pass moral judgements and who believes that there is a truth in these matters so that we must face the possibility that even our most cherished moral judgements may be false.

A timely reaction to the "turn to reasons" in moral philosophy Takes the reader back to the basic normative question Defends a realist conception of the ought-question Boldly claims that the only unique question in ethics is: "What ought to be done?"

Klappentext

This book originated from a discussion between the author, Derek Parfit and Wlodek Rabinowicz, and further developed in correspondence and intense discussions with Wlodek Rabinowics and John Broome. The author disputes the recent trend in metaethics that focuses on reasons rather than norms. The reader is invited to take a new look at the traditional metaethical questions of moral semantics, ontology, and epistemology.

The author mainly concerns himself with particular aspects of these problems: Which are the problems of morality? Are there many different moral questions, or, do they all, in the final analysis, reduce to one? The bold claim made in this book is that there is just one: What ought to be done? Moreover, there is just one source of normativity, just one kind of 'ought'-question, which lends itself to an objectively correct and authoritative answer.

Inhalt
The Humean Notion of Practical Reasons.- The Moral Notion of Practical Reason.- In Defence of Moral Realism.- Some Consequences of Moral Realism.- Reasons from Prudence and Rationality.- Reasons from Justice and Aesthetics.- Reasons to Believe.- Reasons to Desire.- Conclusion.