What We Owe To Each Other

How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? This text offers answers to these questions, and explores the views and values behind them.

Informationen zum Autor T. M. Scanlon is Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, Emeritus, at Harvard University. Klappentext According to T. M. Scanlon's contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he demonstrates how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism. Zusammenfassung How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong! what reason does that give us not do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions! as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Reasons and Values Reasons Values Well-Being Right and Wrong Wrongness and Reasons The Structure of Contractualism Responsibility Promises Relativism Appendix: Williams on Internal and External Reasons Notes Bibliography Index

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Autorentext
T. M. Scanlon is Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, Emeritus, at Harvard University.

Klappentext

According to T. M. Scanlon's contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he demonstrates how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism.

Inhalt

Introduction Reasons and Values Reasons Values Well-Being Right and Wrong Wrongness and Reasons The Structure of Contractualism Responsibility Promises Relativism Appendix: Williams on Internal and External Reasons Notes Bibliography Index