The Problem of Animal Pain

Animal suffering constitutes perhaps the greatest challenge to rational belief in the existence of God. Considerations that render human suffering theologically intelligible seem inapplicable to animal suffering. In this book, Dougherty defends radical possibilities for animal afterlife that allow a soul-making theodicy to apply to their case.

The soul-making position that Dougherty defends here is interesting, subtle, and bold. It represents the first serious and sustained defense of a position that, as I noted, most have written off in a sentence or two. I suspect that this book represents the beginning of a trajectory of scholarship defending soul making theodicies for animal pain and as a result is an important text for philosophers interested in the topic to read with care. (Michael J. Murray, International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 78, 2015)

Autorentext
Yujin Nagasawa is Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Co-Director of the John Hick Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham, UK. He is the author of God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments (2008). He received the Templeton Award for Theological Promise in 2008.

Inhalt
Series Editors' Preface Acknowledgements 1. The Plan of this book 2. The Problem of Animal Pain 3. The Bayesian Argument from Animal Pain 4. Is there Really a Problem? The Challenge of Neo-Cartesianism 5. There is a problem. The Defeat of Neo-Cartesianism 6. The Saint-Making Theodicy I: Negative Phase 7. The Saint-Making Theodicy II: Positive Phase 8. Animal Saints 9. Animal Afterlife Bibliography Index