This book presents a radical reappraisal of British policy towards West German rearmament until the Federal Republic's incorporation into NATO and contains a series of major new theses on British attitudes towards European integration, Anglo-Soviet relations and the 'Special Relationship'. It places policy in the context of Anglo-German distrust, American demands for a German contribution and British fears of antagonising the Soviets. It clarifies numerous controversial issues by demonstrating British willingness to compromise with the Soviets over German unification, the British military's desire to reduce the continental commitment and Eden's enthusiasm for a European Army.

Autorentext

SPENCER MAWBY teaches International History at the London School of Economics, where he has taught since 1995 and took his doctorate. He has studied at the University of Durham, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth and the London School of Economics

Zusammenfassung

'This is an outstanding book dealing with one of the key issues in postwar Anglo-German relations and the first work of its kind to give due prominence to British concerns about a revival of German militarism after 1945. It contains numerous new insights into the foreign policies of the postwar Attlee and Churchill governments and provides an invaluable contribution to the study of this important period in British diplomacy. The detailed account of the workings of British policy in the Cold War era combined with the pertinent analysis of twentieth-century British attitudes to Germany make this book essential reading for students of British foreign policy and the Cold War.' - Jeremy Black, University of Exeter

Inhalt
General Editor's Preface Acknowledgements Introduction The Gendarmerie Schemes The Labour Backlash The EDC Option Rearmament Reconsidered Revisiting Rapallo The Unresolved German Problem Epilogue: Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1956-1990 Bibliography Index