Exploring the history and role of reduction in the philosophy of science and of mind, this volume offers a new framework in which various notions of reduction can be defined, and offers a a powerful explication of an 'ontological', notion of reduction.

This volume investigates the notion of reduction. Building on the idea that philosophers employ the term 'reduction' to reconcile diversity and directionality with unity, without relying on elimination, the book offers a powerful explication of an ontological, notion of reduction the extension of which is (primarily) formed by properties, kinds, individuals, or processes. It argues that related notions of reduction, such as theory-reduction and functional reduction, should be defined in terms of this explication. Thereby, the book offers a coherent framework, which sheds light on the history of the various reduction debates in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of mind, and on related topics such as reduction and unification, the notion of a scientific level, and physicalism.

The book takes its point of departure in the examination of a puzzle about reduction. To illustrate, the book takes as an example the reduction of water. If water reduces to H 2 O, then water is identical to H 2 O thus we get unity. Unity does not come at the price of elimination claiming that water reduces to H 2 O, we do not thereby claim that there is no water. But what about diversity and directionality? Intuitively, there should be a difference between water and H 2 O, such that we get diversity. This is required for there to be directionality: in a sense, if water reduces to H 2 O, then H 2 O is prior to, or more basic than water. At least, if water reduces to H 2 O, then H 2 O does not reduce to water. But how can this be, if water is identical to H 2 O? The book shows that the application of current models of reduction does not solve this puzzle, and proposes a new coherent definition, according to which unity is tied to identity, diversity is descriptive in nature, and directionality is the directionality of explanation.

Explores the history and role of reduction in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind Offers a new, coherent framework within which various notions of reduction can be defined Sheds light on the relation between reductive explanation and neighboring topics, such as mechanistic explanation, unification, levels in science, and metaphysical dependence Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Inhalt

Preface.- Chapter 1. Introduction.- Part 1. The Concept of ReductionAn Explication.- Chapter 2. How to Approach Reduction: Explication and Meta-Science.- Chapter 3. The Puzzle of Reduction.- Chapter 4. Reductive Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation.- Chapter 5. Reductive Explanation.- Part 2. The Explication at Work.- Chapter 6. Reduction in the Philosophy of Mind.- Chapter 7. Conceptions of Reduction in the Philosophy of Science.- Chapter 8. Theory Reduction and Holism.- Chapter 9. Reduction Beyond the Reduction Debate.- Chapter 10. The Reductionist's Commitment.