The guiding dictum of phenomenology is "to the things themselves. " This saying conveys a sense that the "things," the "phenomena" with which we are confronted and into which we seek some insight are not as immediately accessible as may be imagined. Phenomena, however, are often hidden not by their distance from us, but by their very proximity, by the fact that they are taken for granted as being self-evident and understood by all. Even the most common, everyday phenomena and the words used to describe them often reveal, upon closer inspection, a degree of complexity which had previously been unsuspected. Upon interrogation, that which had been taken to be self-evident and widely understood shows itself otherwise; assumed self-evidence frequently masks unintelligibility and common understanding can be a sign of a lack of understanding. One phenomenon which is extremely proximate in our times is the phenomenon of "crisis. " To be sure, one can hardly avoid the word these it abound in periodicals and newspapers, but also, in days. Not only does the learned journals of medicine, political science, economics, art, and law, barely does an edition appear without the discussion of a crisis of one sort or another within these respective fields. One is tempted to remark, along with Umberto Eco, that "crisis sells well. "l One is also inclined to be suspicious of the collective malaise of academics.

Klappentext

This volume sheds light upon the omnipresent discussion of crisis' in our times by returning to the thought of the two philosophers upon which much of this talk is consciously (or unconsciously) based, namely, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. br/ By tracing the narrative of thecrisis' from Husserl's early treatment of arithmetic and logic through to Heidegger's meditations on the essence of technology, the author not only proposes a unified reading of both Husserl's and Heidegger's work, but points to important elements of the often underplayed continuity between these phenomenologists. At the same time, the concept of crisis' also illustrates the difference between Husserl and Heidegger. Though both define the crisis as one offorgetting', and both view this forgetting' as a matter of philosophical responsibility, essential divergence emerges in their interpretation of this phenomenon. Three questions uncover these points of convergence and divergence. First, does not theforgetfulness' reveal itself as a type of emfelix culpa/em, a necessary decay that now reveals itself in a positive light, indeed, as the precondition of history itself? Second, what is presupposed when the subjects is held responsible for forgetting? Third, what are the political consequences of such crisis'-philosophy? This last question allows access not only to hidden political aspects of Husserl's thought, but opens a further perspective for considering Heidegger's overt political activities. br/ emHusserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility/em reveals the presuppositions about history, the subject, and the subject's relationship to a community that lie at the heart of anycrisis-thinking'. While demonstrating in scholarly fashion that the notion of crisis' forms a hermeneutical key to the work of both Husserl and Heidegger, this work also grapples with questions of considerable contemporary significance: for what is philosophyresponsible' in this age of the crisis of reason, and in a broader sense, what does it mean to be responsible' for that which we do not fully control? The author's suggestion of anon-calculative' philosophical responsibility moves away from any notion of philosophical `crisis-management', while still maintaining that philosophy can have practical effects and that certain elements of the Husserlian plea for philosophical responsibility retain their value. br/

Inhalt
One: Husserl and the Crisis as Loss.- One: Husserl's Description of the Crisis.- Two: The Genesis of the Crisis.- THREE: The Crisis as Leitmotiv of Husserl's Thought.- Four: The Overcoming of the Crisis of Forgetting.- Five: The Limits of Responsibility.- Two: Heidegger and the Crisis as Possibility.- Six: Heidegger's Account of the Crisis.- Seven: Fundamental Ontology and the Crisis as Paradox.- Eight: Philosophical Responsibility in the Age of Technology.- Conclusion.