When we make claims to each other, we're asserting. But what does it take to assert well? Do we need to know what we're talking about? This book argues that we don't. In fact, it argues that in some special contexts, we can lie.

Autorentext
Rachel McKinnon is an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at the College of Charleston, USA. She primarily works in epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and feminist philosophy. Her work has appeared in various journals such as Philosophical Studies, American Philosophical Quarterly, and Hypatia.

Inhalt

1. The Norms of Assertion 2. Assertion and Speech Acts 3. Norms of Assertion and Normativity 4. The Supportive Reasons Norm 5. The Lottery Paradox 6. Moore's Paradox 7. 'How Do You Know?' and Challenges to Assertions 8. Performance Normativity 9. Supporting the Supportive Reasons Norm 10. Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge 11. Gender, Power, and the Norms of Indirect Assertion