This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism. Modal empiricism is the view that the aim of science is to provide theories that correctly delimit, in a unified way, the range of experiences that are naturally possible given our position in the world. The view is associated with a pragmatic account of scientific representation and an original notion of situated modalities, together with an inductive epistemology for modalities. It purports to provide a faithful account of scientific practice and of its impressive achievements, and defuses the main motivations for scientific realism. More generally, Modal Empiricism purports to be the precise articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science.

This book is of interest to any philosopher involved in the debate on scientific realism, or interested in how to properly understand the content, aim and achievements of science.

Articulates a novel empiricist position in the debate on scientific realism Critically examines and proposes an alternative to Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism Provides an inductive epistemology for modalities that could be of interest beyond philosophy of science

Autorentext
Quentin Ruyant is currently a post-doctoral fellow in Philosophy of Science at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy of Science at UCLouvain / Université de Rennes 1. He has been working on scientific realism, structural realism and empiricism, and is currently doing research on the role of modalities in scientific representation.

Inhalt

1. The Debates on Scientific Realism.- 2. Theories, Models and Representation.- 3. Contextual Use and Communal Norms.- 4. Modal Empirical Adequacy.- 5. Situated Possibilities, Induction and Necessity.- 6. Scientific Success.- 7. Theory Change.- 8. Semantic Pragmatism. <p