Prior's view on intensionality and truth is based on the principle that sentences never name, that what sentences say cannot be otherwise signified, that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence, and that sentential quantification is neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The text defends each of these principles.

Inhalt
Introduction. Part I: Propositions. 1. Prior's Core Theory. 2. Is Prior a Nominalist? 3. Prior on Truth - a First Look. Part II: Comparisons. 4. Frege and Prior on Intensional Contexts. 5. Prior, Frege and Bealer on Types. 6. Fodor and Prior on Propositional Attitudes. 7. Davidson and Prior on Indirect Quotation. 8. Davidson on the Triviality of Truth. 9. Quine and Prior on Quantification. Part III: Quantification and Generalization. 10. On Understanding Quantification. 11. A Problem for Prior. 12. A Possible Solution. 13. An Alternative Approach. 14. A Model Theory for Sentential Quantification. Part IV: Truth. 15. Prior's Theory of Truth and Falsehood. 16. Non-Objective Truth. 17. Truth Value Gaps and Truth. Notes. References. Name index. Subject Index.