XIV The stability of a philosophical construction will depend not only upon the solidity of the blocks, of the pillars and architraves that make it up, but also upon the way in which all these parts are connected. Of course, it will not be possible to argue for every single part of a philosophical building: to do so would mean to embark in a virtually endless enterprise. Accordingly, some of the parts of a philosophical building will have to be taken from the literature on the subject as 'ready made' or 'semi-finished' elements, while others will be argued for in the course of building. This is what happened in my work too. In some cases (for in stance, in the case of epistemic relativism), my concern was to illustrate theses which I believed to be sufficiently consolidated, rather than to ar gue for them. In other cases - where I was directly engaged in building the theory that I want to fonnulate - I did exactly the opposite. This is what I have tried to achieve, for example, for those proper architraves of my construction, viz. the connection between scepticism and metaphysi cal realism. and the thesis of the nonnative value of the fundamental epistemological notions (truth, objectivity, and rationality).

Klappentext

The current debate in philosophy of science and epistemology is characterised by some strong oppositions, such as those between instrumentalism and scientific realism, methodological anarchism and critical rationalism, historical contextualism and metaphysical realism, naturalism and normativism. By means of a close interaction between historical research and theoretical perspective, this book aims to develop a third way' between absolutism and radical relativism. This new conception is called positive' because it is linked to the basic features of the esprit positif: empiricism, moderate epistemic relativism, and non-metaphysical objectivism. This book revives the early twentieth century controversy between the immanent and transcendent conception of the object of knowledge, and offers a new interpretation of the relationships between Logical Positivism, Kantian thought, and conventionalist philosophy of science. According to the author, such a positive philosophy' is able to counter the conversational' and post-modern attacks on objectivity and truth. Knowledge and Reality presents an original view of the status and role of philosophy, spelling out the intrinsic limitations of the analytic approach, together with the reasons that induce the author to place himself within that tradition. Audience: Libraries and research workers in epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, history of philosophy and history of science, and philosophy of language.

Inhalt
I / Positivisms Old and New.- II / Epistemic Relativism, Apriorism, Neoempiricism.- III / Theory, Observation, and Empiricism.- IV / Logical Idealism, Formal Coherence, and Material Correspondence.- V / Realism, Instrumentalism, Neopositivism.- VI / Truth, Cognitive Objectivity, Metaphysics.- VII / Scepticism, Scientific Rationality, Philosophy.- Index of Names and Subjects.