As a small nation in a hostile region, Israel has made defense a top priority. Tzalel takes a critical look at the naval branch of Israel's defense forces to consider its history, its performance, and its overall importance to maintaining national security. From a motley collection of illegal immigrant ships operated prior to the birth of the state, the Israelis have since the 1960s established a modern navy. However, Tzalel argues, the modernization and expansion of the Israeli navy has been driven more by an excess of funds and the lack of clearly defined priorities than by any real necessity.

Like most small countries, Israel has no need to command the sea during peace or in wartime. The author examines each step of naval development by direct correlation to the perceived need for each new phase and the circumstances that led naval and military leaders to make specific choices, and he discusses the benefits of these choices on the field of battle. He hopes to map the complex relationship between the navy men, the Israeli government, and public sentiment. Although the nation has managed to create a new and impressive class of warship, the Sa'ar FAC(M) and its larger derivatives, Tzalel contends that the military logic behind such naval construction was faulty and that the nation's submarine flotilla constitutes a sheer waste of monetary and human resources.

Zusammenfassung
Although the nation has managed to create a new and impressive class of warship, the Sa'ar FAC(M) and its larger derivatives, Tzalel contends that the military logic behind such naval construction was faulty and that the nation's submarine flotilla constitutes a sheer waste of monetary and human resources.

Inhalt

Introduction Building a Navy Early Days: Palyam versus "The Big Flotilla" Blitzkrieg or a War of Attrition? "Not a Factor"--The Wars of 1956 and 1967 New Ships, New Missions Sea Control Through Naval Blockade Lessons of the Yom Kippur War Almog's New Navy The Navy as a Luxury Item Reality Check--Naval Operations Gun Battles--1948 to 1967 An Interlude of Palyam School Operations The Loss of Eilat and Dakar The Missile Age The Sea as a Gateway Blockade as a Cause of War Blockade in Wartime Gunboat Diplomacy Conclusion Bibliography Index