Running contrary to much contemporary thought, this book argues that Aristotelian virtue ethics allows for at least some action-guiding moral principles to be true unconditionally and that justifying these principles can be done within Aristotelian theory.

Rethinking Virtue Ethics offers a model of Aristotelian virtue ethics based on a deductive paradigm. This book argues that, contrary to what many contemporary thinkers are inclined to believe, Aristotelian virtue ethics is consistent with at least some action-guiding moral principles being true unconditionally, and that a justification for general moral principles can be grounded in fundamental concepts within Aristotle's theory. An analysis of ethical propositions that hold for the most part is proposed that fits well within the deductive paradigm developed. This unique interpretation of virtue ethics has implications for recent discussions of the virtues in social psychology, issues about how fundamental moral principles are known, questions about the justification of inalienable rights, debates about moral particularism and generalism, and discussions of moral realism and anti-realism.

Offers an original and unique contribution to a vibrant discussion in contemporary philosophy Provides a basis for seeing how to make a philosophical case for inalienable rights Explains how unconditional ethical principles are consistent with a virtue based approach to ethics Addresses some of the main challenges and objections to virtue ethics in contemporary literature

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Introduction

1. Moral Realism and Virtue Ethics

2. A Sketch of an Aristotelian Science of Ethics

3. How Are Ethical Principles Known?

4. Some Challenges to the Deductive Model

   Appendix: Can Unconditional Moral Principles be Justified?