This study explores the intersection of moral luck and Christian theology by advancing and developing a counterfactual solution to the problem of moral luck. As originally offered by Michael Zimmerman, we are morally responsible in virtue of not only what we do, but also what we would have done in non-actual circumstances. This solution carries two significant metaphysical commitments: true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom (the bedrock of molinist accounts of providence) and a haecceity view of personal identity. The resulting account of responsibility eliminates all (the standard) forms of moral luck and connects the agent''s moral status to a particular species of control. This study then examines the nature of that control and the standard objections to a luck-free account of responsibility, and it explores how it is that we are oriented morally to the luck-bound world around us. These findings are then applied to the Christian theological framework, explaining how it is that all human persons may be inescapably and deeply culpable-suffering from original sin-in a way that is consistent with God''s justice and love, and how they yet remain capable of a kind of moral restoration. The project then considers how we might be saved by divine grace and enjoy a kind of heavenly libertarian freedom, while exploring both old and new avenues for Christian theology.

Autorentext
Mark B. Anderson is professor at Tarrant County College.

Klappentext

Can we be held responsible for factors beyond our control? Would a just God judge us differently because of luck-or even divine manipulation? Can a fair and just evaluation of humanity result in a universally failing grade?

Moral Luck and Christian Philosophical Theology: A Molinist Perspective engages these questions by tackling the intersection of Christian theology and the moral luck dispute. The solution it offers-building upon the work of Michael Zimmerman-is to develop a counterfactual account of moral responsibility, which eliminates all forms of moral luck. Anderson argues that this solution will carry two metaphysical commitments associated with the molinist model of divine providence: counterfactuals of libertarian freedom and a haecceity view of personal identity. He then develops the account from a moral perspective, examining how we can meaningfully engage the luck-bound world around us without the burden of moral luck. Finally, he examines the theological ramifications of the view, explaining how it is that all human persons may be inescapably and deeply culpable-suffering from original sin-in a way that is consistent with God's justice and love, and how we yet remain capable of a kind of moral restoration. Anderson's suggestion is a radical one, but it offers new avenues for Christian theology while preserving the essential core of the Christian tradition.

Inhalt

Introdcution
Chapter 1: The Problem outside the Cloister
Chapter 2: The Problem inside the Cloister
Chapter 3: The Solution Understood Metaphysically
Chapter 4: The Solution Understood Morally
Chapter 5: The Solution Understood Theologically
Glossary
References