This monograph is a defence of the Fregean take on logic. The author argues that Frege´s projects, in logic and philosophy of language, are essentially connected and that the formalist shift produced by the work of Peano, Boole and Schroeder and continued by Hilbert and Tarski is completely alien to Frege's approach in the Begriffsschrift. A central thesis of the book is that judgeable contents, i.e. propositions, are the primary bearers of logical properties, which makes logic embedded in our conceptual system. This approach allows coherent and correct definitions of logical constants, logical consequence, and truth and connects their use to the practices of rational agents in science and everyday life.

Introduces a powerful conceptual framework that integrates contemporary logics Offers an unexplored explanation of how the Fregean priority of propositions stands Presents a novel path for returning contemporary logic to the practical hands of human agents

Autorentext

María J. Frápolli is a Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada (Spain). From 2006 to 2012, she held the presidency of the Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Spain. Currently, she chairs the Spanish Society for Women in Philosophy (Analytic). From 2015 to 2017, Prof. Frápolli held a Marie-Sk odowska-Curie grant at the Department of Philosophy, University College London and, from 2017 to 2020, was Honorary Professor in the same department. She has worked on the philosophy of language, logic, and mathematics, always from a pragmatist and naturalist standpoint. Some of her books are the following. As author: The Nature of Truth. An Updated Approach to the Meaning of Truth Ascriptions, Springer (2013). As editor: Expressivisms, Knowledge and Truth, Cambridge University Press, (2019); Saying, Meaning, and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire (UK), Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition (2007); and F. P. Ramsey. Critical Reassessments. London (UK), Continuum Studies in British Philosophy, (2005).

Klappentext

This monograph is a defence of the Fregean take on logic. The author argues that Frege s projects, in logic and philosophy of language, are essentially connected and that the formalist shift produced by the work of Peano, Boole and Schroeder and continued by Hilbert and Tarski is completely alien to Frege's approach in the Begriffsschrift. A central thesis of the book is that judgeable contents, i.e. propositions, are the primary bearers of logical properties, which makes logic embedded in our conceptual system. This approach allows coherent and correct definitions of logical constants, logical consequence, and truth and connects their use to the practices of rational agents in science and everyday life.

Inhalt
Part I: The Pragmatist Basis. 1. Pragmatism and Metaphysics: The General Background.- 2. Groundbreaking Principles.- 3. Semantic and Pragmatic Hints in Frege's Logical Theory.- Part II: Logical Constants. 4. Implying, Precluding, and Quantifying Over: Frege's Logical Expressivism.- 5. Lessons from Inferentialism and Invariantism.- 6. The Inference-Marker View of Logical Notions: What a Pragmatism Proposal Looks Like.- Part III: Further Applications of Propositional Priority. 7. Grue, Tonk, and Russell's Paradox: What Follows from the Principle of Propositional Priority?.- 8. Visual Arguments: What is at Issue in the Multimodality Debate?.- 9. Truth and Satisfaction: Frege Versus Tarski.- 10. Truth Ascriptions as Prosentences: Further Lessons of the Principle of Propositional Priority.