This book presents a theoretical investigation of the formation of regional free trade agreements (FTAs), the behavior of global enterprises, and government trade policies in various game forms including multi-stage games, repeated games, and timing games. In the last few decades, the number of FTAs has been rapidly increasing in the world, especially in Asia. In particular, East Asian countries are expected to be main engines for sustaining the world economy. Focusing on East Asian economies, strategic behaviors of governments and firms in order to attain their own aims are examined. The analytical methods employed in this book are those currently being developed or that recently have been created. The topics are important contemporary issues in regional areas facing the rapid economic changes brought about by globalization. Most chapters of this book are based on original work that was published in international journals but now has been completely rewritten, with restructuring and extension of the original work. This book, with its up-to-date information, will be of interest to academic researchers in universities and economic research institutions and to students working on advanced degrees in economics.

Provides a theoretical analysis of the formation of regional trade areas Uses the theory of a timing game in the analysis of strategic trade policies Analyzes the behavior of firms in international trade

Inhalt

Part I: The Formation of Free Trade Agreements.- 1. Expansion of Free Trade Agreements, Overlapping Free Trade Agreements and Market Size.- 2. The Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade and Mode of Competition: Stackelberg versus Cournot Competitions.- 3. Sustainability of Free Trade Agreements under a Maximum Revenue Tariff.- 4. Technology Choice, Firm Behavior, and Free Trade Agreements.- Part II: The Timing of Trade Policies.- 5. Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy under the Three-Country Model.- 6. Endogenous Timing Decision on Trade Policies between Importing and Exporting Countries with Many Firms.- Part III: The Roles of Trade Policies.- 7. Government Intervention Brings about Free-Trade Outcomes in the Long Run.- 8. Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariff under Oligopoly: A Note.- 9. Cost Asymmetries and Import Tariff Policy in a Vertically Related Industry.- 10. Strategic Trade Policy and Food Trade.- 11. International Price Competition among Food Industries: The Role of Income, Population and Biased Consumer Preference.