This book explores whether there exists a distinct form of cognitive phenomenality that cannot be reduced to sensory experience. To investigate this central question in the cognitive phenomenology debate from an introspective-empirical perspective, the method of introspection is examinedalong with its challenges and criticismsthrough an evaluation of both historical and contemporary approaches to introspective research. In addition, a qualitative-empirical study of thinking activity is conducted to uncover performative and agentive phenomena, which may serve as arguments for a cognitively phenomenal dimension irreducible to sensory or emotional experience.

Academic Work Phenomenology History of Psychology

Autorentext

Dr. Jonas Raggatz has been deeply engaged with the topic of consciousness for many years. After earning his B.Sc. in Biology and M.Sc. in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Cognition, he worked as a research associate in the field of transdisciplinary consciousness studies at Alanus University, where he also completed his doctoral dissertation with the present work. Since 2024, he has been a research associate at Witten/Herdecke University. His research focuses include epistemology, introspection, the mind-body problem, and thinking.

Inhalt

1 Introduction.- 2 Cognitive Phenomenology Debate.- 3 Introspection.- 4 Empirical Study.- 5 Discussion: Cognitive Phenomenology and First-Person Experience.- 6 Summary and Outlook.- 7 References.