People want more from the government. One thing they want more of is a sense of personal safety, at home and at work (Regulation, Fall 1991). People also want the government to quit wasting money. The objective of having the government provide a safer life for us and our children at minimum cost leads logically to looking at policy within the system involving the private sector plus governments at the federal and sub federal levels. Using numerical simulations our book takes an integrated quantitative look at how the various institutions influencing workplace safety lead to the observed levels of illnesses and injuries among U.S. workers. Our innovation is piecing together the mosaic of interactions among workers, employers, state government, and the federal government that is numerically realistic in the sense of using economists' current knowl edge of quantitative connections. Our objective has been to write a Gray's Anatomy, if you will, of how the U.S. economic system, as tempered by government policy, jointly determines employment patterns, wages, and workplace safety levels.

Klappentext

This book uses numerical simulations to take an integrated quantitative look at how the various institutions influencing workplace safety lead to the observed levels of illnesses and injuries among U.S. workers. The book pieces together the mosaic of interactions among workers, employers, state government, and the federal government that is numerically realistic in the sense of using economists' current knowledge of quantitative linkages. The objective has been to map out how the U.S. economic system determines employment patterns, wages, and workplace safety levels. br/

Inhalt
1 Introduction.- Why OSHA Did Not Prevent the Tragic Fire.- U.S. Workplace Injuries and Illnesses.- Workplace Safety Programs in the United States.- Econometrically Studying Job Safety.- The Simulation Approach to Studying Job Safety.- Summary of Key Simulation Results.- Notes.- 2 The Economics of Workplace Safety.- Labor Market Equilibrium with Work-Related Health Hazards.- Workplace Safety Policy.- The Need for Numerical Simulation Research.- Conclusion.- Notes.- 3 The Simulation Model.- A Mathematical Description of Hedonic Labor Market Equilibrium.- Numerical Simulation Techniques.- Parameterizing the Simulation Model.- Initial Numerical Simulation Results.- Sensitivity Checks.- Calibrating the Simulation Model.- Conclusion.- Appendix 3A: Mathematical Derivation of the Continuous Model.- Appendix 3B: Structural Equations and Initial Parameter Values.- Notes.- 4 The Safety Policy System.- Numerical Simulation Details.- Numerical Simulation Results.- Two Possible Refinements in WC and OSHA.- Conclusion.- Appendix 4A: Structural Equations and Initial Parameter Values.- Notes.- 5 Asymmetric Information Problems in Workers' Compensation Insurance.- Labor Market Equilibrium.- Numerical Simulation Details.- Numerical Simulation Results.- Conclusion.- Notes.- 6 Policy Implications.- OSHA During the 1970s Versus the 1980s.- Reforming OSHA.- Workers' Compensation Insurance and Safety.- Reforming Workers' Compensation.- Conclusion.- Notes.- References.