Recently, firms have been criticized for focusing too strongly on the short term and for neglecting investments in assets and capabilities required for long-term success, such as investments in R&D or in employee training. Family firms are considered to be different. They are commonly assumed to be more long-term oriented than comparable non-family firms. Joern Block analyzes this phenomenon in more detail and investigates whether and under which conditions family firms pursue more long-term oriented strategies than other firms. To this end, he compares R&D activities, downsizing practices and executive compensation of family firms with those of non-family firms. He also develops a theoretical model of how to pay a non-family manager who works in a family firm.

Autorentext

Dr. Joern Block is a researcher at the Schöller Chair in Technology and Innovation Management at Technische Universität München. His research focuses on innovation, entrepreneurship, and family firms.

Inhalt
Family firms.- Long-term orientation of firms.- Data and method.- Performance of family firms.- Family firms and R&D spending.- Family firms and employment downsizing.- Family firms and executive pay.- Executive pay in family firms: a principal-agent model.- Summary, implications, and outlook.