This is a collection of essays about logic and its applications to various philosophical problems. In general, it is argued that logic constitutes an important device of philosophical analysis. Concerning the nature of logic the author defends the thesis that first-order logic is the logic. Among the philosophical problems to which logic is applied in the essays are: truth, consistency, realism, foundations of semantics, psychologism, undetermination of theories by empirical data, modalities, value concepts, identity, vagueness, God's existence, transcendentals, legal reasoning, category mistakes, bivalence, the cognitive relation, and meaningfulness.

Autorentext

Jan Wolenski studied law and philosophy at Jagiellonian University. He taught at Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland) from 1963 to 1979 and at the Technical University of Wroclaw from 1979 to 1988. He returned to Jagiellonian University in 1988. Since 1990 he is professor of philosophy at Jagiellonian University. He retired in 2011. Currently he is professor at the University of Informatics, Technology and Management in Rzeszów. He is a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences and Letters and the International Institute of Philosophy. The author published 25 books, edited or co-edited 30 collections, and published more than 600 scientific papers.

Inhalt

Contents: Logic, Rhetoric and Hermeneutic in Philosophy Truth and Satisfaction by the Empty Sequence Metalogical Observations about Undetermination of Theories by Empirical Data Psychologism and Metalogic Malum, Transcendentalia and Logic Logic, Semantics, and Realism First-Order Logic: (Philosophical) Pro and Contra What is Formal in Formal Semantics? On Some Formal Properties of Truth Gödel, Tarski and Truth Is Truth an Ontological Concept? What are Truth-Bearers? A Generalization of Hume s Thesis Tarskian and Post-Tarskian Truth Two Critical Contributions to the Problem of Truth and Meaning On So-Called Sentences with Category Mistakes The Cognitive Relation in a Formal Setting Models of Legal Reasoning The Character of T-Equivalences Remarks on Identity across Possible Worlds Applications of Squares of Oppositions and Their Generalizations Theism, Fideism, Atheism, Agnosticism The Principle of Bivalence and Suszko Vagueness and Ambiguity Truth and Consistency Meaningfulness, Meaninglessness and Language-Hierarchies Some Lessons from Ingarden s Criticism of the Verifiability Principle Remarks on Axiomatization within Logic.