The greatest threat to Western unity in the 1960s came not from a communist enemy but from an ally: France. De Gaulle challenged the dominance of the US by bringing crises to the EEC and NATO and seeking détente with the Soviet bloc. As this book shows, the US and Britain cooperated successfully to ensure that his plans did not prosper.

'A lucid and important study of a critical period in the transatlantic alliance, based on extensive research in American and British sources. Ellison explores issues that still shape our contemporary world.' - Professor David Reynolds, Cambridge University.

'On the basis of an impressive amount of archival material, James Ellison's study offers an authentic and captivating analysis of one of the most critical phases in transatlantic relations resulting from Charles de Gaulle's breach with NATO as an integrated military alliance. In depicting American and British attempts to contain this crisis, he sheds striking new light on the British decision to reapply for membership of the Common Market and to retreat from its engagement 'East of Suez'.' - Professor Dr Klaus Schwabe, University of Aachen, Germany

'With this carefully researched and well-argued study, we can better understand the working dynamics of the US-UK special relationship, a partnership of extraordinary durability and effectiveness. The great irony that Ellison's book reveals is that the US-UK relationship was transformed and strengthened as much by the challenge posed by an erstwhile ally, France, as by their Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union. This is a very important and timely historical study, and deserves the attention of scholars and policymakers alike.' - Professor Thomas Schwartz, Vanderbilt University, USA

Autorentext
JAMES ELLISON is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of History at Queen Mary, University of London, UK. His research is primarily focused on Anglo-American and Anglo-European relations, the history of the Cold War and European integration. He is author of Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community, 1955-58

Inhalt
Introduction Facing de Gaulle's Challenge, 1963 to 1965 Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity: Anglo-American Collaboration and French withdrawal from NATO, January to June 1966 Crisis Defused: Anglo-American Cooperation and Divergence in Atlantic-European Affairs, June to December 1966 The US and Britain's Approach to Europe, January to March 1967 The Decision to Apply and to Pull Out, Anglo-American Relations, Britain's Second EEC Application and East of Suez, March to June 1967 De Gaulle's Challenge Contained: the Anglo-American Relationship in Transition, June 1967 to June 1968 Conclusion