Internet and Network Economics

Klappentext

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007, held in San Diego, CA, USA, in December 2007. The contents were carefully reviewed and selected. The papers are organized in topical sections on equilibrium, information market, sponsored auction, network economics, mechanism design, social networks, advertisement pricing, computational general equilibrium, network games, and algorithmic issues.

Inhalt
WINE 2007.- Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its History.- My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of Its Applications.- Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm.- The Computation of Equilibria.- A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimization.- New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games.- A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets.- An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria.- Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games.- Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets.- Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and Performance.- Information Sharing Communities.- Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions.- Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions.- Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising.- Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search.- Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions.- Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction.- Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games.- Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics.- Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets?.- On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems.- Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities.- Mechanism Design I.- False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team.- Mechanism Design on Trust Networks.- Stochastic Mechanism Design.- A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks.- A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests.- A Theory of Loss-Leaders: Making Money by Pricing Below Cost.- PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution.- Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks.- Advertisement Pricing I.- Sponsored Search with Contexts.- Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions.- Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions.- Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids.- An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism ?-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget.- Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences.- Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities.- Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets.- Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes.- On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets.- Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games.- The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games.- Secure Relative Performance Scheme.- Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization Problem.- The Wi-Fi Roaming Game.- On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games.- The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs.- A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle Game.- Group Dominant Strategies.- Weighted Boolean Formula Games.- Core Stability of Vertex Cover Games.- Mechanism Design II.- Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions.- Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal Problems.- To Be or Not to Be (Served).- Advertisement Pricing II.- Ad Auction Design and User Experience.- Personalized Ad Delivery When Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm.- Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search.- Pay-per-action Model for Online Advertising.- Public Advertisement Broker Markets.- Mechanism Design III.- K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation.- Monotone Properties ofRandomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions.- Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search.- On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions.- Characterizing Truthful Market Design.