Ferdinand Pöhlmann argues that a sense of one's own basic abilities to move is a constitutive condition on the ability to perceive the world spatially. This constitutive relation explains why egocentric spatial representation is to be regarded as a kind of self-representation. In arguing for these claims, conceptual as well as empirical questions are discussed and an overview of accounts that take action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation is given. The picture that emerges is linked to the phenomenological (Scheler) as well as to the analytic (Evans) tradition in the Philosophy of Mind.

A philosophical study Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Autorentext
Ferdinand Pöhlmann received his doctorate from the Philosophy Department at Eberhard Karls Universität, Tübingen. He is currently working in the editorial office of a global publishing company in Stuttgart.

Inhalt
Basic Way of Representing Oneself between mere Reflexivity and Self-Consciousness.- A Sense of one's Action Possibilities as the Constitutive Basis of Spatial Perception.- Discussed Approaches: Perry, Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, Evans, Hurley, Noë, and Others.- Empirical Evidence: Inverted Vision Studies, Sensory Substitution Devices and Others.