Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

This book examines fair revenue proportions for airline alliances. It looks at the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly, and develops a new selfish revenue allocation rule.

A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

Explains in detail how the operations research methods are applied to a real-life problem as revenue sharing of airline alliances Combines concepts in game theory with OR methods Includes comprehensive surveys on the related subjects Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Autorentext
Demet Çetiner worked as research assistant at the University of
Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2008-2012. Since 2012 she has worked at the Supply Chain Consulting department of Bayer Technology Services.

Inhalt
Introduction.- Selected Topics in Revenue Management.- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances.- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory.- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game.- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances.- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances.- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices.- Conclusion and Future Research.- Appendix: Computational Study.