Revised and updated to provide over 100 worked-out exercises on game theory with detailed step-by-step explanations Presents games that are required in most courses at the undergraduate level and gradually advances to more challenging games appropriate for graduate level courses Includes new chapter on cheap talk games Emphasizes the economic principles behind each exercise and avoids unnecessary complex notation Ranks exercises according to difficulty for self-guided study Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Autorentext
Felix Muñoz-Garcia *is an Associate Professor in the School of Economic Sciences at Washington State University. His research focuses on the areas of microeconomics, industrial organization, and game theory, with applications to environmental regulation under incomplete information and firms' entry-deterring practices in polluting industries. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh in 2008. He has published in the *Canadian Journal of Economics, Theory and Decision, Journal of Regulatory Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, and Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, among others.
Daniel Toro-González is an Associate Professor in the School of Economic and Business at Universidad Tecnologica de Bolivar. His research is in industrial organization and econometrics, with applications to technology adoption, transportation, and the food industry. He receiveda Ph.D. in Economics from Washington State University in 2012. He has published in the Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization, and The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics.

Inhalt

Chapter 1: Dominance Solvable Games.- Chapter 2: Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium and Simultaneous-move games with complete information.- Chapter 3: Mixed Strategies, Strictly competitive games, and Correlated Equilibria.- Chapter 4: Sequential-move games with complete information.- Chapter 5: Applications to Industrial Organization.- Chapter 6: Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria.- Chapter 7: Simultaneousmove games with Incomplete Information.- Chapter 8: Auctions.- Chapter 9: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling games.- Chapter 10: Cheap Talk Games.- Chapter 11: More advanced signaling games. Index.