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Daniel McDowell is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University.
Klappentext
Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? explores how and why the U.S. has regularly acted, often alongside the IMF, as an international lender of last resort by selectively bailing out foreign economies in crisis. Daniel McDowell highlights the unique role that the U.S. has played in stabilizing the world economy from the 1960s through 2008.
Zusammenfassung
Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? explores how and why the U.S. has regularly acted, often alongside the IMF, as an international lender of last resort by selectively bailing out foreign economies in crisis. Daniel McDowell highlights the unique role that the U.S. has played in stabilizing the world economy from the 1960s through 2008.
The book offers novel insights into the unique role that the United States has played in stabilizing international financial crises, while also shedding light on the limitations of the IMF to act as an ILLR. McDowell's writing style is clear and easy to comprehend for both experts and nonexperts alike, and the book's rich case studies help provide useful context to key findings discovered in the statistical analyses.
Autorentext
Daniel McDowell is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University.
Klappentext
Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? explores how and why the U.S. has regularly acted, often alongside the IMF, as an international lender of last resort by selectively bailing out foreign economies in crisis. Daniel McDowell highlights the unique role that the U.S. has played in stabilizing the world economy from the 1960s through 2008.
Zusammenfassung
When financial crises occur, it has long been accepted that national economies need a lender of last resort to stabilize markets. In today's global financial system, crises are rarely confined to one country. Indeed, they often go global. Yet, there is no formal international lender of last resort (ILLR) to perform this function for the world economy. Conventional wisdom says that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has emerged as the de facto ILLR. Yet, that premise is incomplete. Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? explores how the United States has for decades regularly complemented the Fund's ILLR role by selectively providing billions of dollars in emergency loans to foreign economies in crisis. Why would U.S. policymakers ever put national financial resources at risk to "bailout" foreign governments and citizens to whom they are not beholden when the IMF was created for this purpose? Daniel McDowell argues the United States has been compelled to provide such rescues unilaterally when it believes a multilateral response via the IMF is either too slow or too small to protect vital U.S. economic and financial interests. Through a combination of historical case studies and statistical analysis, McDowell uncovers the defensive motives behind U.S. decisions to provide global liquidity beginning in the 1960s, moving through international debt crises of the 1980s and emerging market currency crises of the 1990s, and extending up to the 2008 global financial crisis. Together, these analyses paint a more complete picture of how international financial crises have been managed and highlight the unique role that the U.S. has played in stabilizing the world economy in troubled times.
Inhalt
Table of Contents
Table of Figures
Table of Tables
Preface
List of Abbreviations
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction
CHAPTER 2 - The ILLR in Theory and Practice
1.1 The ILLR and the Hegemon
1.2 The ILLR and the IMF
2.1. The Problem of Unresponsiveness
2.2. The Problem of Resource Insufficiency
3.1. The Mechanics of Currency Swaps
3.2. Speed and Independence
3.3. Lending Capacity
3.4. Division of Labor
CHAPTER 3 - The United States Invents its Own ILLR, 1961-1962
1.1 From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut
1.2. Two Threats: The "Gold Drain" and Speculation
2.1. The General Arrangements to Borrow
3.1. The Fed's Novel Idea
3.2. Who Needs the IMF?
3.3. How the Swap Lines Protected U.S. Interests
3.4. Why did Europe Cooperate?
CHAPTER 4 - The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s
2.1. The IMF's "Concerted Lending" Strategy and the Problem of Unresponsiveness
2.2. The ESF and "Bridge Loans": Correcting for the Problem of IMF Unresponsiveness
3.1. Capital Account Crises and IMF Resource Insufficiency
3.2. The ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource Insufficiency
CHAPTER 5 - Who's In, Who's Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bailout, 1983-1999
CHAPTER 6 - U.S. International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s
2.1. Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, 1982-1983
2.2. Argentina, 1984
2.3. Poland, 1989
2.4. Mexico, 1995
2.5. Thailand, 1997
2.6. Indonesia and South Korea, 1997
2.7. Declining Use: The ESF is Put Out to Pasture
CHAPTER 7 - The United States as ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008-2009
5.1 The Initiation of the Swap Lines and the TAF, August 2007 - December 2007
5.2 Incremental Expansion of Liquidity Facilities, March 2008 - August 2008
5.3. Rapid Growth of the Swap Program: September 15, 2008 - October 28, 2008
5.4. Swap Lines for Four Emerging Markets: October 29, 2008
CHAPTER 8 - Conclusions
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX