This expansive book uses neuroscience to examine consciousness from the inside, as we experience it, and from the outside as we encounter it in science. Covers pain, visual, auditory and olfactory experience, higher-order theories of consciousness and more.

This volume is product of the third online consciousness conference, held at http://consciousnessonline.com in February and March 2011. Chapters range over epistemological issues in the science and philosophy of perception, what neuroscience can do to help us solve philosophical issues in the philosophy of mind, what the true nature of black and white vision, pain, auditory, olfactory, or multi-modal experiences are, to higher-order theories of consciousness, synesthesia, among others. Each chapter includes a target article, commentaries, and in most cases, a final response from the author. Though wide-ranging all of the papers aim to understand consciousness both from the inside, as we experience it, and from the outside as we encounter it in our science.

The Online Consciousness Conference, founded and organized by Richard Brown, is dedicated to the rigorous study of consciousness and mind. The goal is to bring philosophers, scientists, and interested lay persons together in an online venue to promote high-level discussion and exchanging of views, ideas and data related to the scientific and philosophical study of consciousness.

Cutting-edge interdisciplinary discussion between philosophers and scientists about consciousness Unique setup: contributions include commentary and author's response to deepen the discussion Website support: http://consciousnessonline.wordpress.com

Autorentext
Professor Brown is a philosopher at the City University of New York at the LaGuardia Community College. His work is focused on the philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, and the foundations of cognitive science. For more information, please visit the homepage of professor Brown: www.onemorebrown.com.

Inhalt
Chp. 1 Richard Brown Introduction.- I. First-Person Data and the Science of Consciousness.- Chp. 2. Ruth Millikan An Epistemology for Phenomenology?.- Chp. 3. Gualtiero Piccinini & Corey J. Maley From Phenomenology to the Self-Measurement Methodology of First-Person Data.- II. Phenomenal Properties and Dualism.- Chp. 4. Paul Churchland Consciousness and the Introspection of Apparent Qualitative Simples.- Chp. 5. Torin Alter Churchland on arguments against physicalism.- Chp. 6. Paul Churchland Response to Torin Alter.- III. Property Dualism and Panpsychism.- Chp. 7. Philip Goff Orthodox Property Dualism + the Linguistic Theory of Vagueness = Panpsychism.- Chp. 8. Bill Robinson A Wake Up Call.- Chp. 9. Jon Simon What is Acquaintance with Consciousness?.- Chp. 10. Philip Goff Reply to Simon and Robinson.- IV. Naïve Realism, Hallucinations, and Perceptual Justification.- Chp. 11. Benj Hellie It's Still There!.- Chp. 12. Jacob Berger Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness.- Chp. 13. Jeff Speaks Some Thoughts about Hallucination, Self-Representation, and It's Still There!.- Chp. 14. Heather Logue But Where is a Hallucinator's Perceptual Justification?.- Chp. 15. Benj Hellie Yep Still There.- V. Beyond Color-Consciousness.- Chp. 16. Kathleen Akins Black and White and Color.- Chp. 17. Pete Mandik What is Visual and Phenomenal but Concerns Neither Hue nor Shade?.- VI. Phenomenal Externalism and the Science of Perception.- Chp. 18. Adam Pautz The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: New Evidence for a Brain-Based Theory of Consciousness.- Chp. 19. David Hilbert & Colin Klein No Problem.- Chp. 20. Adam Pautz Ignoring the Real Problems for Phenomenal Externalism: A Reply to Hilbert and Klein.- VII. The Ontology of Audition.- Chp. 21. Jason Leddington What We Hear.- Chp. 22. Casey O'Calleghan Audible Independence and Binding.- Chp. 23. Matt Nudds Commentary on Leddington.- VIII. Multi-Modal Experience.- Chp. 24. Kevin Connolly Making Sense of Multiple Senses.- Chp. 25. Matt Fulkerson Explaining Multisensory Experience.- IX. Synesthesia.- Chp. 26. Berit Brogaard Seeing as a Non-Experiential Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Mental Imagery.- Chp. 27. Ophelia Deroy Synesthesia: An Experience of the Third Kind?.- Chp. 28. Berit Brogaard Varieties of Synesthetic Experience.- X. Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness and the Prefrontal Cortex.- Chp. 29. Miguel Angel Sebastián Not a Hot Dream.- Chp. 30. Josh Weisberg Sweet Dreams are Made of This? A HOT Response to Sebastián.- Chp. 31. Matt Ivonowich The dlPFC isn't a NCHOT: A Commentary on Sebastián's Not a HOT Dream.- Chp. 32. Miguel Angel Sebastián I Cannot Tell You (Everything) About My Dreams: Reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg.