Informationen zum Autor Chris Den Hartog is an assistant professor of political science at California Polytechnic State University. He has published articles and chapters about the legislative process in Congress, its evolution across history, and its effects on congressional policy making. Professor Den Hartog's work includes studies of the nineteenth-century House and the contemporary House and Senate. Klappentext Proposes a new theory of Senate agenda setting. Zusammenfassung This book proposes a new theory of Senate agenda setting that reconciles a divide in literature between the conventional wisdom - in which party power is thought to be mostly undermined by Senate procedures and norms - and the apparent partisan bias in Senate decisions noted in recent empirical studies. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface; Part I: 1. Costly consideration and the majority's advantage; 2. The textbook senate and partisan policy influence; 3. The costly consideration agenda-setting theory; Part II. Consideration Costs in the Senate: 4. Committees and senate agenda setting; 5. Scheduling bills in the Senate; 6. Effects of filibusters; 7. Disposition of majority and minority amendments; 8. Killing amendments with tabling motions and points of order; 9. Effects of amendments; Part III. Testing the Costly-Consideration Theory: 10. Testing our model; 11. Implications of costly consideration; Appendix A: relaxing the model's assumptions; Appendix B: last actions and coding amendment disposition.

Klappentext

Proposes a new theory of Senate agenda setting.

Zusammenfassung
This book proposes a new theory of Senate agenda setting that reconciles a divide in literature between the conventional wisdom - in which party power is thought to be mostly undermined by Senate procedures and norms - and the apparent partisan bias in Senate decisions noted in recent empirical studies.

Inhalt

Preface; Part I: 1. Costly consideration and the majority's advantage; 2. The textbook senate and partisan policy influence; 3. The costly consideration agenda-setting theory; Part II. Consideration Costs in the Senate: 4. Committees and senate agenda setting; 5. Scheduling bills in the Senate; 6. Effects of filibusters; 7. Disposition of majority and minority amendments; 8. Killing amendments with tabling motions and points of order; 9. Effects of amendments; Part III. Testing the Costly-Consideration Theory: 10. Testing our model; 11. Implications of costly consideration; Appendix A: relaxing the model's assumptions; Appendix B: last actions and coding amendment disposition.