I first became interested in the relationship between Locke's anti essentialism and his theory of identity in a first-year graduate course on metaphysics taught at Syracuse University by Jose Benardete. I had until then approached Locke as a "safe", commonsense philosopher, whose metaphysical agenda-constrained as it was by his concept empiricism was largely geared towards upholding a scientifically enlightened, broadly Christian worldview. I am greatly indebted to Professor Benardete for disabusing me of this understanding of Locke's work. Benardete's Locke was not the Locke that I had been exposed to as an undergraduate, not the Locke that I had found in Copleston's History of Philosophy. Rather, he was a profoundly creative and audacious metaphysician, who was justly perceived to be a tremendously dangerous philosopher by his more traditional contemporarie s. And as much I had admired Copleston's Locke, I have become positively enthralled with Benardete's. The topics of identity and essentialism have become mainstays of contemporary metaphysics, and it is no understatement to say that Locke's contribution to modem debates on these matters is enormous. My early interest in Locke's work on essentialism and identity-through-time was motivated by two factors. First, although there are a number of obvious and significant conceptual connections between these topics, Locke's own theorizing about identity seems not to have been informed by his critique of essentialism or vice versa.

Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Klappentext

This book is a study of John Locke's metaphysics of organisms and persons, with particular emphasis on his theory of identity through time and his conventionalism with respect to kinds and essences. After presenting three arguments for thinking that the organisms and persons in Locke's ontology have both spatial and temporal extent, the author argues that on a four-dimensional ontology there is no contradiction between Locke's theory of identity and his rejection of essentialism.

Inhalt
Substances, Essences, And Kinds.- Identity And Persistence.- Locke's Critique of Essentialism.- Locke On The Accidental/Essential Property Distinction.- Locke On The Nature And Existence Of Natural Kinds.- Locke On The Classification Of Corporeal Substances.- Locke On Kinds And Particulars.- Locke's Theory Of Identity.- Locke's Concept Of Identity.- Identity And The Ideas Of Things.- Does Locke Have A Consistent Theory Of Identity?.- Locke On The Persistence Of Organisms And Persons.- Organisms And Their Material Parts.- Locke's Organismic Theory Of Personal Identity.- Locke's Thought Experiments And Problem Cases.- Conclusion.- Objections And Replies.- The Charge Of Anachronism.- Four-Dimensional Bodies And The Corpuscularian Hypothesis.- Conclusion.- Relativistic Anti-Essentialism And A Four-Dimensional Lockean Ontology.- The Anti-Essentialist Implications Of A Four-Dimensional Lockean Ontology.- Two Objections.- Conclusion.- Bibliograpy.