The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars

This revisionist study shows how the Royal Navy's ideas about the meaning and application of seapower shaped its policies during the years between the wars. It examines the navy's ongoing struggle with the Treasury for funds, the real meaning of the 'one power standard', naval strategies for war with the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy, the influence of Mahan, the role of the navy in peacetime, and the use of propaganda to influence the British public.

Autorentext

Christopher M. Bell is Professor of History at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. He is the author of Churchill and the Dardanelles (2017) and Churchill and Sea Power (2012), and co-editor of At the Crossroads between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference of 1930 (2014) and Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective (2003). 

Zusammenfassung
It examines the navy's ongoing struggle with the Treasury for funds, the real meaning of the 'one power standard', naval strategies for war with the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy, the influence of Mahan, the role of the navy in peacetime, and the use of propaganda to influence the British public.

Inhalt
List of Maps List of Tables Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction The Politics of Seapower: the 'One Power Standard' and British Maritime Security 'Main Fleet to Bermuda': British Naval Strategy for an Anglo-American War Far Eastern War Plans and the Myth of the Singapore Strategy 'The Ultimate Potential Enemy': Nazi Germany and British Defence Dilemmas The Search for the 'Knock-Out Blow': War Plans against Italy Neither Corbett nor Mahan: British Naval Strategy and War Planning 'Showing the Flag', Deterrence, and the Shipbuilding Industry 'Something Very Sordid': Naval Propaganda and the British Public Conclusion Select Bibliography Index