Autorentext

Jody Azzouni received a MS in mathematics and a MA in philosophy from NYU and a PhD from the CUNY Graduate Center. He joined the faculty of the philosophy department at Tufts University in 1985 and has published many books and articles in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of psychology, metaphysics, epistemology, and occasionally aesthetics.

Klappentext

We think we know who we are by introspection, but recent results in the cognitive sciences show this is false. In The Anatomy of Experience Jody Azzouni explores the interconnections between the old-fashioned ways of learning about ourselves, via introspection and behaviourial patterns, and more recent tools from cognitive psychology and neuroscience designed to study the brain. Azzouni investigates our access to purported faculties of mind, our senses, our abilities to infer and remember and evaluates the metaphysical and epistemological status of these faculties. He argues that we have no such faculties in any genuine sense, and that our sensory and cognitive abilities, as we have self-described them for centuries, are, in a significant sense, not real. In fact, most of what we think about ourselves is a nearly indistinguishable projection onto the reality of who we are.

Folk-psychology is, instead, where our self-image as cognitive agents is rooted. Folk-psychological concepts are indispensable for our characterization of ourselves as psychological beings. Neuroscientific advances in our understanding of ourselves require the folk-psychological framework in order to understand new developments about our minds. The sum result is a kind of Kantian picture of our understanding of ourselves. How we describe our minds is something we recognize to not describe how we are "in ourselves." Instead, how we are in ourselves can only be described in pure neurophysiological terms.

Inhalt

• Introduction

• Part I. Some History and Some Philosophy of Language

• 1: Descartes' Versions of the Sortability and Traceability Theses

• 2: The Language of Visual Phenomenology

• Part II. Some Phenomenology

• Introduction to Part II

• 3: Representing, Representations, and the Method of Phenomenological Comparison

• 4: Categorical Phenomenology

• 5: Visual Content

• 6: The Phenomenology of Inference

• 7: Cue-Driven Labeling

• Part III. Propositional-Attitude Language and Neurophysiology

• 8: Propositional-Attitude Language and Cognitive Science

• Conclusion

• Appendix: Belief Is Metacognitive; Knowledge Needn't Be