This book is an exploration of what it takes for an event to count as an action. I first became interested in this topic nearly a decade ago while working on a different topic. I kept coming across philosophers making claims about the nature of action that seemed false or at least dubious to me. As a consequence I turned to the philosophy of action directly, to get to the heart of the matter. I have wrestled with this territory ever since. I hope that, with this book, I have finally earned the intuitions that put me at odds with the philosophers I was originally reading. This book develops ideas in Part Two of my doctoral dissertation, which I wrote at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. I loved being at Queen's, for both professional and personal reasons. My thanks go to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support as a doctoral candidate. Steve Leighton and Ronald de Sousa were readers for my dissertation. They provided some early and invaluable challenges to the ideas developed here. My deepest debt of gratitude is owed to David Bakhurst, my supervisor. I learned a lot from David; this book would not be the same without his help.

Application of externalism, in model from philosophy of mind, to philosophy of action Explicit diagnosis of and resistance to foundationalism in philosophy of action Connection of traditional concerns of philosophical study of action to moral philosophy Revision and defence of H.L.A. Hart's ascriptivism about the nature of action Division of philosophy of action into production issues and status issues

Klappentext

What makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions.

Inhalt
Two Questions.- Ascriptivism Resurrected: The Case for Ascriptivism.- Ascriptivism Defended: The Case Against Ascriptivism.- Responsibility and Causation I: Legal Responsibility.- Responsibility and Causation II: Moral Responsibility.- Foundationalism and the Production Question.- Foundationalism and the Status Question: Strong Productionism.- Nouveau Volitionism.- Weak Productionism.- Concluding Reflections on Ascriptivism and Action.