An analysis and assessment of Nietzsche's metapsychology. Nietzsche is neither a dualist nor a physical reductionist about the mind. Instead, he is best interpreted as thinking that the mind is embodied and embedded in a larger natural and social environment with which it is dynamically engaged.

Autorentext
Rex Welshon is Professor of Philosophy and Senior Associate Dean of the College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs, USA. His primary philosophical interests are in philosophy of mind, philosophy of neuroscience and the philosophical work of Nietzsche.

Inhalt
Series Editors' Foreword Introduction 1. Naturalism, Science, Positivism 2. Embodiment, Embeddedness, Teleology 3. Perception, Perspectivism, Falsification 4. Drive, Affect, Thought 5. Reflective Consciousness, Phenomenalism, Epiphenomenalism 6. Self, Will, Power Notes Bibliography Index