The following is neither exclusively the study of a philosopher nor a problem, and yet is both as well. Alfred Schutz is now recogniz ed to have been a profoundly insightful philosopher who explor ed the nature of social reality and the social sciences. His works are exercising a great influence in a wide range of problems and disciplines, the latter including the social sciences themselves. All of this is testimony to the sagacity and penetrating character of his analyses as well as the fruitfulness and soundness of his con cepts. Philosophy proceeds, however, by not merely accepting the work of great philosophers, but by engaging them in critical philosophic dialogue. It is time for this interchange to begin with respect to Schutz's work. To some extent, then, this work is di rected to that task. It does not undertake a systematic treat ment of the whole of Schutz's philosophy, for much more work in many aspects of his thought is yet to be done before such a pro ject can reasonably be undertaken. Yet, the issue of concern in this study is, I now believe, the philosophic center of the whole of Schutz's work.

Inhalt

I. Introduction.- 1. The Lifeworld and Intersubjectivity.- 2. Typification.- 3. Social Action.- 4. Social Interaction.- 5. Provinces of Meaning.- 6. Relevance.- II. Some Fundamentals of Phenomenology.- III. Schutz's Reflections on Relevance.- 1. Introductory Remarks.- 2. The Kinds of Relevance.- 3. Interdependency of the Kinds of Relevance.- 4. The Formation of the Stock of Knowledge.- 5. Disturbances of Sedimentation.- 6. The Structure of the Stock of Knowledge.- 7. The Articles and Relevance.- 7.1. Typification, the Stock of Knowledge, and Social Action.- 7.2. Relevance as Selectivity.- IV. Critical Remarks on Schutz's Theory.- 1. Introduction: Synopsis of Critical Remarks.- 2. Reflection.- 2.1. Schutz's Theory of Reflection.- 2.2. Husserl's Account of Reflection.- 2.2.1. Husserl's position.- 2.2.2. Schutz's interpretation of Husserl.- 2.3. Critical Evaluation.- 3. Typification.- 3.1. Schutz's Account of Husserl's Theory of Typification.- 3.2. Schutz's Stance on Typification.- 3.3. Discussion of the "Operative" Notions in Husserl.- 3.4. Evaluation.- 4. Critique of Schutz's Reflections on Relevance.- 4.1. Active and Passive Processes in Schutz's Reflections.- 4.1.1. Monothetic and polythetic processes.- 4.1.2. Topical relevances.- 4.1.3. Interpretational relevance.- 4.1.4. Motivational relevances.- 4.1.5. Summary of activity-passivity problems.- 4.2. Noesis and Noema in Schutz's Reflections.- 4.2.1. Noesis and noema for Husserl.- 4.2.2. The continuousness of the sense field.- 4.2.3. Schutz's use of noesis and noema.- 4.3. Intentionality and Meaning.- 4.4. Critical Remarks on Schutz's Interpretation of Husserl.- 5. Summary of Critical Remarks.- V. The Founding of Relevance.- 1. Typification and Relevance.- 2. Foundedness.- 3. The Relevances.- 4. Relevance and Judging.- VI. Relevance, Science, and the Social Sciences.- 1. The Province of Scientific Theory.- 2. The Domain of the Social Sciences.- 2.1. Social Sciences and the Lifeworld: Constructs and Social Observers.- 2.1.1. First and second order constructs.- 2.1.2. The lifeworld and the social sciences.- 2.2. Models of the Social World: Ideal Types.- 3. Critical Remarks.- 1. Schutz's Works.- 2. Husserl's Works.- 3. Other Works.