Michael Di Francesco is an Associate Professor and Case Program Director at the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, and the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Australia. He has held academic appointments at the Universities of Sydney and Melbourne, and Victoria University of Wellington, and expert advisory roles at the NSW Treasury, International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

Zusammenfassung
This work explores how reshaping budget rules and how they are applied presents a preferred means of public sector budgeting, rather than simply implementing fewer rules. Through enhanced approaches to resource flexibility, government entities can ensure that public money is used appropriately while achieving the desired results. The authors identify public budgeting practices that inhibit responses to complex problems and examine how rule modification can lead to expanded budget flexibility. Through a nuanced understanding of the factors underlying conventional budget control, the authors use budget reforms in Australia to show the limits of rule modification and propose "rule variability" as a better means of recalibrating central control and situational flexibility. Here, policy makers and public management academics will find a source that surveys emerging ways of reconciling control and flexibility in the public sector.iv>

Inhalt

1. Introduction.- 2. Non-routine problems and flexibility.- 3. Flexibility, inflexibility and budgeting.- 4. Budget rules and budget flexibility.- 5. Budget reform and rule modification.- 6. Calibrating budget flexibility and control: A new role for rule variability.- 7. Conclusion.