Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals

What are epistemic reasons? What are epistemic norms? What is our basic epistemic goal? In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms, and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. Pursuing these questions has not only proven fertile for our understanding of key concepts and phenomena studied in epistemology, but also for a wide area of issues in philosophy of mind and action and in philosophy of language and meta-ethics. The present volume brings together eighteen essays, seventeen of them new, by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) different aspects of epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism, and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers and students of philosophy interested in epistemic normativity and beyond.

Autorentext

Martin Grajner and Pedro Schmechtig, TU Dresden, Germany.

Klappentext

In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. The present volume brings together eighteen essays by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers interested in epistemic normativity.