Dale Dorsey considers one of the most fundamental questions in philosophical ethics: to what extent do the demands of morality have normative authority over us and our lives? Must we conform to moral requirements? Most who have addressed this question have treated the normative significance of morality as simply a fact to be explained. But Dorsey argues that this traditional assumption is misguided. According to Dorsey, not only are we not required to conform to moral demands, conforming to morality's demands will not always even be normatively permissible--moral behavior can be (quite literally) wrong. This view is significant not only for understanding the content and force of the moral point of view, but also for understanding the basic elements of how one ought to live.

Autorentext

Dale Dorsey is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kansas. He has published widely on issues in normative ethics, metaethics, and political philosophy.

Inhalt

Introduction; 1 The Concept of Normative Authority; 2 A Priori Rationalism; 3 Supremacy and Impartiality; 4 Supremacy and the Supererogatory; 5 Defending and Rejecting Permission, Part One: Defending; 6 Defending and Rejecting Permission, Part Two: Rejecting; Bibliography; Index