Does authoritarian rule benefit from political repression? This book claims that it does, if restrictions and violence, two fundamentally different forms of repression, complement each other. Based on an in-depth quantitative analysis of the post-Second World War period, the author draws three central conclusions. Firstly, restrictions and violence offer different advantages, suffer from different drawbacks, and matter differently for identical problems of authoritarian rule. Secondly, empirical data supports complementarity only as long as political repression preempts political opposition. Lastly, despite its conceptual centrality, political repression has little influence on the outcomes of authoritarian politics. The book also offers new insights into questions such as whether repression hinders successful political campaigns or whether it is more likely to trigger coups d'état.

Autorentext

Dag Tanneberg studied Political Science at the Universities of Halle/Saale and Berlin, Germany, as well as at Duke University, Durham, USA. Currently, he works at the University of Potsdam. His research focuses on issues of autocracy, human rights and contentious politics, as well as political science methodology. He has published articles in various journals, such as Contemporary Politics, Governance & Politics, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Contemporary Politics, and Governance & Politics.

Inhalt

1 Introduction

1.1 The Puzzle

1.2 The Argument in a Nutshell

1.3 Plan of the Book

References

2 Toward a Theory of Political Repression

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Why is Political Repression Important to Authoritarian Rule?

2.3 What the Punishment Puzzle Says About Political Repression

2.4 Reconceptualizing Repression: Restrictions and Violence 2.5 How Do Restrictions and Violence Connect? 2.6 Conclusion

References

3 How to Measure Dictatorship, Dissent, and Political Repression

3.1 Introduction

3.2 What Counts as Authoritarian Rule?

3.3 Recognizing Dissent Under Authoritarian Rule

3.4 How to Measure Political Repression

3.4.1 Problems in Measuring Political Repression

3.4.2 Operationalization of Violence and Restrictions 3.4.3 Debating Important Reservations 3.5 Conclusion

3.6 Appendix

3.6.1 Authoritarian Spells, Campaigns, and Repression

3.6.2 Summary of More Flexible Lag Structures

3.6.3 Uncertainty About Violence by Level of Restrictions

References

4. Does Repression Prevent Successful Campaigns?

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Taking Stock of Campaigns

4.3 How Repression Impedes Campaigns

4.4 Design and Data

4.4.1 Hints to Sample Selection Bias

4.4.2 How to Correct for Sample Selection Bias

4.4.3 Data

4.5 Results

4.5.1 Exploratory Findings

4.5.2 Statistical Analysis

4.5.3 Robustness Tests

4.6 Discussion

4.7 Conclusion

4.8 Appendix

4.8.1 Summary Statistics

4.8.2 Dierence-In-Means by Campaign Status

4.8.3 Marginal Eects Accounting for Sample Selection Bias

4.8.4 Results for a Graded Measurement of Campaign Success

4.8.5 Results for Unique Observations

4.8.6 Bootstrap Results

References

5 Does Repression of Campaigns Trigger Coups d'État?

5.1 Introduction

5.2 What's in a Coup d'État?

5.3 How Repression Discourages Coups in the Shadow of Campaigns

5.4 Design and Data

5.4.1 A Bayesian Multilevel Framework for Analysis

5.4.2 Data

5.5 Results

5.5.1 Statistical Analysis

5.5.2 Robustness

5.6 Discussion

5.7 Conclusion

5.8 Appendix

5.8.1 Summary Statistics

5.8.2 Summary of Within- and Between-Dierences

5.8.3 Results for a Fully Specied Interaction Term

5.8.4 Results for an Alternative Coding of the Coup d'État

5.8.5 Fixed Eects Estimation Results

5.8.6 Cross-Classied Bayesian Multilevel Analysis

References

6 Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Summary of the Book

6.3 Main Findings

6.4 Added Value and Limits of the Analytical Framework

6.5 Avenues for Future Research

6.6 Conclusion

References