Does authoritarian rule benefit from political repression? This book claims that it does, if restrictions and violence, two fundamentally different forms of repression, complement each other. Based on an in-depth quantitative analysis of the post-Second World War period, the author draws three central conclusions. Firstly, restrictions and violence offer different advantages, suffer from different drawbacks, and matter differently for identical problems of authoritarian rule. Secondly, empirical data supports complementarity only as long as political repression preempts political opposition. Lastly, despite its conceptual centrality, political repression has little influence on the outcomes of authoritarian politics. The book also offers new insights into questions such as whether repression hinders successful political campaigns or whether it is more likely to trigger coups d'état.

Analyzes political repression as a tool to secure the stability of authoritarian rule Offers an in-depth empirical study of the post-Second World War period Studies the effects of repression on political campaigns or the likelihood of coups d'état

Autorentext

Dag Tanneberg studied Political Science at the Universities of Halle/Saale and Berlin, Germany, as well as at Duke University, Durham, USA. Currently, he works at the University of Potsdam. His research focuses on issues of autocracy, human rights and contentious politics, as well as political science methodology. He has published articles in various journals, such as Contemporary Politics, Governance & Politics, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Contemporary Politics, and Governance & Politics.

Inhalt
Chapter 1 - Introduction.- Chapter 2 - Toward a Theory of Political Repression.- Chapter 3 - How to Measure Dictatorship, Dissent, and Political Repression.- Chapter 4 - Does Repression Prevent Successful Campaigns?.- Chapter 5 - Does Repression of Campaigns Trigger Coups d'État?.- Chapter 6 - Conclusion.