This book is the first to challenge current orthodoxy that Chamberlain's appeasement policy before World War Two was justified by Britain's inability to pay for rearmament. The book shows that British war potential was actually massive, with a solid foundation in the existing Imperial economy. Using previously unconsidered and recently declassified documents from British and American archives the author demonstrates that the deliberate and political rejection of rearmament in the hope of eventual American support proved catastrophic for Britain.

Autorentext

CHRISTOPHER PRICE specialises in the study of British history and international relations between the world wars, and has written on British rearmament and Anglo-American political economy. Since completing his doctorate in 1998 he has worked as a Visiting Professor at the University of Leeds, College of Ripon and York in the Programme of American Studies. He is shortly to teach in the Department of Economics at the University of York.

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Acknowledgements Abbreviations The Fall of Sterling 1938-9 and International Events Preface New Rules for an Old Game: The Shaping of Fourth Arm Concepts in a Fluid Environment, 1919-31 'On the Upgrade': Britain's Unwelcome Recovery 'The Destiny of Tomorrow': A Transatlantic Alliance Forms Against Ottawa, 1936 The Devil in the Detail: A Necessary Case for Economic Danger and the Formulation of the Fourth Arm Policy Between Hitler and Wall Street: Undeclared War versus Business as Usual, March-October 1938 'It Seems Like Insanity': The Anglo-American Trade Agreement of 1938 and the Point of No Return A 'Maginot Line for the Pound': Profligacy in Defence of a Bankrupt Policy, November 1938-January 1939 'Not a Damned Bit Good': The Concealed Catastrophe, 1939 Conclusion Notes and References Bibliography Index