In this volume, Baz offers a wide-ranging discussion of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-perception, with special focus on Wittgenstein's method. Baz starts out with an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and continues with attempts to characterize and defend Wittgenstein's approach to the understanding and dissolution of philosophical difficulties. Baz ends with attempts to articulate-under the inspiration of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology-certain dissatisfactions, both with Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception, and with his philosophical approach more generally. On the way, Baz explores connections between Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and Kant's aesthetics. He examines ways in which the remarks on aspects may be brought to bear on contemporary philosophical work on perception. He discusses some of the implications of Wittgenstein's work on aspect perception for issues in moral philosophy and the philosophy of action. Wittgenstein said the problem of aspect perception was as hard as granite, and no one is a more capable, persistent and imaginative stonecutter than Baz. Using insights from Merleau-Ponty's work, he shows how the philosophical significance of what is involved in "seeing something as something" is still being widely misunderstood and underappreciated. These essays stand out by their depth and honesty, and raise new questions that anyone working in the area will have to address. - Martin Gustafsson, Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland

Autorentext
Avner Baz is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Tufts University. He is the Author of When Words are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy (Harvard, 2012), and The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy (Oxford, 2017). He has also published papers on Kant's Ethics and Aesthetics, on Wittgenstein, on J. L. Austin and Ordinary Language Philosophy, on Stanley Cavell, and on Perception. 

Klappentext

In this volume, Baz offers a wide-ranging discussion of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-perception, with special focus on Wittgenstein's method. Baz starts out with an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and continues with attempts to characterize and defend Wittgenstein's approach to the understanding and dissolution of philosophical difficulties. Baz ends with attempts to articulateunder the inspiration of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenologycertain dissatisfactions, both with Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception, and with his philosophical approach more generally.  On the way, Baz explores connections between Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and Kant's aesthetics. He examines ways in which the remarks on aspects may be brought to bear on contemporary philosophical work on perception. He discusses some of the implications of Wittgenstein's work on aspect perception for issues in moral philosophy and the philosophy of action. Wittgenstein said the problem of aspect perception was as hard as granite, and no one is a more capable, persistent and imaginative stonecutter than Baz. Using insights from Merleau-Ponty's work, he shows how the philosophical significance of what is involved in seeing something as something is still being widely misunderstood and underappreciated. These essays stand out by their depth and honesty, and raise new questions that anyone working in the area will have to address.  Martin Gustafsson, Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland

Inhalt
Chapter 1. What's the Point of Seeing Aspects?.- Chapter 2. On Learning from Wittgenstein; or What does it Take to See the Grammar of Seeing Aspects?.- Chapter 3. Aspect Perception and Philosophical Difficulty.- Chapter 4. The Sound of Bedrock: Lines of Grammar between Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell.- Chapter 5. Aspects of Perception.- Chapter 6. Motivational Indeterminacy.- Chapter 7. Wittgenstein and the Difficulty of What Normally Goes Without Saying.- Chapter 8. Bringing the Phenomenal World into View.